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1. Introduction
Equality is treated as one of the effects of welfare state (Golinowska 2018,  
pp. 22-23) and at the same time as the key category of welfare economics (Blake 
2006, p. 3, 171ff.). Equality is considered in connection with distributive justice1, 
taking into account both normative (distributive justice defined through equality) 
and positive relations (distributive justice results in equality in a given area) 
between these two categories (Szarfenberg 2008, p. 71). Hence, equality is a relevant 
criterion in defining, operationalisation, implementation, control and assessment 
of social policy (Schmähl 2009, p. 122; Szumlicz 2015, p. 14).  
Analysis of the literature on the subject of equality in social policy shows an 
important cognitive weakness: the concept is seldom conceptualised and particularly 
rarely operationalised (Österle 2002, p. 46). At the same time, in literature on pensions 
we can observe remarkable chaos in terminology concerning equality. It is also 
characteristic that both researchers and decision-makers, when referring to pension 
provisions, usually cite distributive justice in its default sense, while literature 
mentions numerous definitions thereof.  
Equality as a principle of distributive justice in the pension system is usually 
referred to in two contexts: either as a constraint on or the goal of pension reforms 
(Howse 2007). In the former case, justice referred to equality is a criterion on the 
basis of which the character of proposed reforms is analysed, evaluated and 
selected.  It is assumed at the same time that their implementation cannot infringe 
justice in the pension system (e.g. excessively burden the generations which are 
financing the provisions), without explicitly defining the set of its qualities 
(referents/denotations). In the latter case, when justice is the goal of the reform and 
the premise of the changes undertaken in the pension policy, the reform is aimed at 
achieving defined referents of justice in the pension system (e.g. achieving inter-
generational justice). 
1 Distributive (allocative) justice refers to “distribution of something that people cannot 
provide to themselves sufficiently compared to their needs or demands” (Rysz-





Pension system is one of the most important institutional platforms for the fulfilment 
of distributive justice principle. The base pension provision (i.e. common, obligatory, 
state-initiated and often state-delivered), which primarily amounts to the volume of 
collected and transferred financial means, constitutes a significant area for distributive 
justice to take place.  
Equality in the pension system is usually taken into consideration in the description 
and assessment of pension systems. For instance, in the open method of co-
ordination of the EU pension systems equality is indicated directly as the aim of 
modernisation and indirectly in the context of adequacy (e.g. the level of replacement 
rate) and financial stability of pension systems (Żukowski 2010; Chybalski 2012, 
p. 79ff.). The World Bank approaches equality as one of the six criteria of pension 
systems assessment (Holzmann et al. 2008, p. 8ff.). It’s worth noting that intra-
generational equality in pension systems is by far less frequently analysed (Kohli 
2008, p. 196).  
Equality in the context of gender, understood as formally identified equal rights 
and treatment of both men and women is a crucial premise in the EU legislation 
and activities (Śledzińska-Simon 2011). Research of pension systems from the 
point of view of gender equality encompasses mainly regulations and the benefit 
levels for men and women. The regulations refer to formal equality and are 
directed at the analyses of pension regulations in terms of the access to the 
provision and its amount. The latter are concentrated on the impact of regulations 
on actual access to a pension system and on estimation of provision amounts for 
men and women considering their differing biographies.   
The concern with analysis and especially evaluation of pension systems from the 
gender perspective is important for several reasons. Firstly, it stems from the 
increase in female activity on the labour market, especially starting from the 60’s 
of the twentieth century. Obtaining income from labour leads to individual 
pension entitlements in pension systems and this in turn inspires research of 
pension level differences between genders (Jefferson 2009; James 2011). Secondly, 
changes in the family model including a limited occurrence of the single 
breadwinner model seem to question the traditional forms of pension security for 
women based on derived entitlement in the form of a survivor’s benefit. Thirdly, 
pension reforms conducted in various countries are clearly directed at strengthening 
equivalence of the contribution and the pension, which has an adverse effect on 
pension amount received by females. This is caused by unstable or interrupted 
careers on the labour market as well as differentiation between retirement ages of 
men and women in some of the countries. 
The aim of the article is to operationalize equity with regard to one of the equity 
dimensions, i.e. the equity of desert within a generation in the pension system. In the 
next step the intergenerational (in)equity between women and men in the Polish 
(obligatory) pension system will be identified. The calculations will focus on the 
results of the descriptive microsimulation model, which bases on the female and 
male biographies and pension outcomes received from the new pension system. 
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2. Equality of desert – definition
The studies of literature and analyses of the available research findings indicate 
clearly that the category of equality is a key instrumental value of social policy 
and it determines another value, which is distributive justice. In the course of the 
research I assumed that the relations between these two categories are both 
conceptual and normative in character. A conceptual relation may be considered 
at least in two aspects (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1. Conceptual relations between justice and equality 
Source: author’s own work. 
Firstly, equality may be understood as a principle which determines operation  
of other principles („the principle’s principle”, meta-principle) and understood 
as undiscriminating (treating equally) for all the subjects belonging to the given 
category. Secondly, equality refers to the criteria (distribution principles) which 
are implemented in (re)distribution of limited goods. In the adopted approach, 
equality is not limited to just one distribution principle i.e. equality of situation 
which leads to a narrowly taken egalitarianism. I have assumed that there is a set 
of distribution principles consisting of five criteria: desert, situation, needs, access 
and opportunities.  
The relation between equality and distributive justice may be normative in character. 
In such case the factual condition is the subject of description and evaluation from the 
point of view of an equality principle or a bundle of equality principles. Hence,  
a discovered inequality (as opposed to diversity or differentiation) may become the 
premise for activities directed at its limitation or even abolition.  
It should be emphasised that the paper discusses the subject of real equality (referred 




other things, to organise research findings on various aspects of equality which 
are / can be referred to as equality dimensions. In research so far, one could use 
three equality dimensions i.e. (1) a subjective one, giving the answer to the 
question who is the subject of equality, (2) an objective one, answering the question 
what is the object of equality and (3) a dimension of distribution principles, answering 
the question of how/on the basis of what / which? equality criterion a given good 
is distributed. I have used two additional criteria, which are: (4) the time 
dimension which answers the question when equality is examined and (5) the 
space dimension, which answers the question in which area of pension provision 
and where equality is examined. As a result, I have developed an original five-
dimensional matrix of equality dimensions (who? what? how? when? where?) and 
a set of features of these dimensions (denotations) with reference to the base 
pension provision (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Multidimensional approach to equality in a pension system 
Source: author’s own work. 
 
In this paper a real equality of pension provision between women and men in the 
first year of their receiving obligatory pension, which is distributed according to 
the principle of desert is used. 
Desert is an ambiguous term and it is sometimes used as a synonym for the term 
merit. However, “merit is a broader concept, the genus of which the desert is the 
species” (Pojman 1999, p. 86). Merit results from any feature or quality of a subject 
which is a base for the positive or negative (demerit) attribution of that subject 
even if the treatment is not undeserved. Desert is connected with the positive 




responsibility of subject for his or her action. The question remains, what is treated 
as a merit and for what is the individual subject responsible, so what is the desert 
exactly? Is the desert only the result of the action or should the effort be also taken 
into consideration? Furthermore, there is a question of how the desert should be 
transferred into the distribution of desired good. 
In the pension system, the term desert is noted twofold: (1) as an input into the 
pension system and (2) as a position.   
An input covers both financial and non-financial input. The first one is associated 
with a pension contribution, which is paid in the pension system (fund) directly, 
mostly on a base of individual earnings. As a result the final individual pension 
entitlements should reflect the previous pension contributions proportionally. It is 
also called individual pension equivalence, which means individual actuarial 
pensions (Disney 2006, p. 269). Pension reforms introduced in the last decades 
were at least partly aimed at individualization of pension entitlements and 
followed the individual pension equivalence (Holzmann 2013).2 The non-financial 
input is associated with the activities conducted in the private sphere. The decision 
about which of those activities are treated as an input into the pension system and 
how they are transferred into individual pension entitlements is a normative issue. 
There has been e.g. a criterion of positive external effects used, which are 
generated by the individual, family, generation or sex (Leisering 2004, p. 16 and 
f.). For the evaluation of the private activity in the pension system it is important, 
if an activity was performed instead of a paid-work or not. In other words, there 
is a question of a trade-off between paid and unpaid work or between financial 
and non-financial input into the pension system. If an unpaid activity (e.g. care) is 
done in a place of paid work, this activity can be evaluated on the basis of non-
performed paid work. It means that the individual pension entitlements refer to 
the level of contributions, which would be transferred to the pension system if the 
paid work was not stopped by the private activity. It is in line with the idea of 
pension insurance, which is a selective one and covers employed workers. The 
other approach is to treat the private activity (e.g. care) as  non-financial input 
even if the paid work is performed simultaneously. In this case the non-financial 
input is treated as a per se input into the pension system. Evaluation of such input 
can refer to the value of the positive external effects or increase in the GDP 
(Döring 1998, p. 2018). 
Position is treated in the pension system merely as a professional one and 
identified with a (public) service. There is an assumption that the service also 
involves the pension retirement phase and the old-age security is a part of the 
salary in a broader sense. Because of this a DB pension formula is very often used. 
From that point of view, the term ‘position’ in the pension system can be treated 
as a part of specific desert (Raphael 2003, p. 172; following Šimo 2009, p. 70).  
                                                            
2 It is true that individualization of the pension entitlements often follows the shift towards 
a private pension system, but the DC pension formula was also introduced without 
movement towards funding (Moshe and Ratajczak 2020). 
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3. Equality of desert – operationalization
In the operationalization of the equality of desert only the financial and non-
financial input is considered. Financial input refers to the individual contributions. 
In the pension systems which receive state subsidies (like in Poland), individual 
share of those subsidies could also be taken into consideration and counted as 
financial input. However, there are at least three difficulties in doing it: a) the 
amount of subsidy has been various in different years, b) the subsidy is covered 
by diverse tax revenues paid by the group which differs from the group of pension 
contribution payers, c) the contribution payers/ insured people pay different taxes. 
The non-financial input covers non-paid activities, which are recognized in the 
pension system and which increase the individual pension level. In this paper the 
non-paid activities include all care periods, for which pension contributions are 
paid by the third subject, e.g. the state. In Poland it includes especially (Ratajczak 
2019, pp. 83-86): (1) periods of maternity, parental, paternity and child care leave or 
long-term care for dependent children and (2) long-term care for dependent elders.   
The assessment of the relation between (financial and non-financial) input and 
output (pension provision) is related to actuarial equivalence. It is assumed, that: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡 𝑃𝑉 𝑡  (1) 
where: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡  – present value of the pension contributions of the n-contributor at the 
moment of retirement in the t-year, 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡  – present value of the n-beneficiary at the moment of retirement in the 
t-year. 
In the Polish pension system the present value of the pension contributions 
consists of the pension capital on the individual pension account and individual 
pension subaccount in the first pillar at the moment of retirement (at the moment 
of achieving the minimum retirement age).3 Because of that: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡 𝐾 𝑡 𝐾 𝑡  (2) 
where: 
𝐾 𝑡  – pension capital on the individual account in the first payg pillar of the 
n-person at the moment of retirement in the t-year, 
𝐾 𝑡   – pension capital on the individual sub-account in the first payg pillar of 
the n-person at the moment of retirement in the t-year. 
The pension capital can be treated as a lump-sum contribution. From the actuarial 
point of view, pension payments are lifelong annuities, paid in advance (𝑎 , with 
a constant interest and payment: 
3 It was assumed, that there is no funded pillar and the total pension contribution is split 
between individual account and subaccount in the first, payg financed pension pillar. This 
assumption is justified, because the aim is to estimate the differences between sexes, so 
resigning from the funded pillar both for women and men should not influence the 
outcome of calculation. Furthermore, it could have some influence if the structure of 
women and men who belong to the first payg and second funded pillars differed, but there 
is no proper data concerning that issue. 
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𝑎 ∑ 𝑣 ∙ 𝑝  (3) 
where: 
x – age of the person who retires, 
𝜔 – top age limit (110 years old) of the person who retires, 
𝑣  – discount factor, 
𝑝  – probability of survival up to time k of a person at the age of x. 
It means, that: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡 𝑎  ∙ 𝐸
 
𝑡 ∑ 𝑣 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝐸 𝑡  (4) 
where: 
𝐸𝑎𝑝 𝑡  – lifelong annuity of a males/females in the year t, 
𝑝  – sex (m – male, f – female).
For the calculation of the lifelong annuity uni-sex tables are used. It is consistent 
with the EU-recommendation. 
For the operationalization of the equality of desert a difference between the factual 
pension provision and lifelong annuity will be calculated. This difference will  
be called the indicator of pension equivalence 𝐸𝑒𝑝 𝑡  for the beneficiaries born in the 





∙ 100% (5) 
where: 
𝑝  – sex (m – male, f – female),
𝐸 𝑡   –  median of the pension provision of males/females born in the year t, 
𝐸𝑎𝑝 𝑡   –  median of the annuities of males/females born in the year t. 
As it was mentioned above, a decision about what is the non-financial input and how 
it is transferred into the pension entitlements is a normative one. In the next step of 
operationalization of the equality of desert the following assumption is made: every 
activity which is considered a non-financial input will be evaluated with the 
contribution calculated on the basis of the paid work. It means that the contribution 
base for every non-financial input will be the monthly salary (the average wage by 
sex and age). In the case of the Polish pension system the mentioned leaves because 
of child care or dependents as well as the non-activity periods caused by delivering 
care will be taken into consideration. As a result, the corrected indicator of pension 
equivalence 𝑆𝐸
 
𝑡  is proposed and calculated as following: 
𝑆𝐸
 
𝑡  ∙ 100% (6) 
where: 
𝑝 – sex (m – male, f – female),
𝐸 𝑡   – median of the pension provision of males/females born in the year t, 
𝐸′𝑎𝑝 𝑡  – median of the annuities of males/females born in the year t for the corrected 




The present value of the contributions for the corrected contribution base for the 
care periods 𝑃𝑉′ 𝑡  is calculated as: 
𝑃𝑉′ 𝑡 𝐾 ′ 𝑡 𝐾 ′ 𝑡     (8) 
where: 
𝐾 ′ 𝑡  – pension capital on an individual account in the first payg pillar of the n-
person at the moment of retirement in the t-year for the corrected 
contribution base for the care periods, 
𝐾 ′ 𝑡  – pension capital on an individual subaccount in the first payg pillar of the 
n-person at the moment of retirement in the t-year for the corrected 
contribution base for the care periods. 
The annuity for the corrected contribution base for the care periods 𝐸
 
𝑡  for 
women or men born in the year t will be calculated according to (4) and by 
consideration of the lump-sum net contribution.  
The indicator of the equality of desert is calculated as a weighted average mean of the 
difference in the indicator of pension equivalence according to gender 𝑅𝐸
 
𝑡  and the 
difference in the corrected indicator of pension equivalence according to gender 
𝑅𝑆𝐸
 
𝑡 , when the weight of both partial indicators amounts to 50%. 
 
4. Equality of desert in the Polish pension system 
Empirical analyses adopt a specially designed model which belongs to the 
category of micro-simulation descriptive models. The model makes it possible to 
obtain macro-aggregates of data (e.g. the median of female pension income) on 
the basis of projections of information about individuals (here – the participants 
of the pension system). Such models are applicable for studying redistributive 
effects of various policies (Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006; Żółtaszek 2013,  
p. 42ff.). It is worth emphasising that in Poland the microsimulation descriptive 
model has not been yet used for the analysis of the old age provision and  
the models which have been applied (SIMPL, EUROMOD sub-model and the 
Ministry of Finance model) are mainly connected with the subject of taxation and 
benefits. (Żółtaszek 2013, p. 8, 18ff.). Furthermore, the microsimulation method 
has only been partially used so far in pension system in Poland and mainly for 
estimation of inter-generational redistribution (e.g. Jablonowski and Müller 2013).   
The scope of the empirical study encompasses Poland and refers to a cohort aged 
18-25, affected by the new pension system of 1999 only and will reach retirement 
age in 2034-2046. While the estimates concerning the levels of provision were 
based on genuine data until the end of 2018, starting from 2019 simulations of 
career related and non-career related biographies have been absolutely necessary. 
A descriptive microsimulation model contained four modules: (1) earnings, (2) breaks 
in earnings (14 reasons for lack of earnings were distinguished); (3) family situation 
before reaching retirement age; (4) pension calculation. On these grounds, 
hypothetical individual biographies with annual frequency were generated, where the 
events affecting the value of the raised capital were selected at random. Each 
occurrence was modelled by means of categorical distribution, or for its possibly 
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exceptional case Bernoulli distribution. Probability for the distributions was 
calculated on the basis of authentic data. In total, I performed 20000 simulations for 
the cohorts born between 1974-1981 (more Ratajczak 2019, pp. 71-83).  
The regulations concerning the access to the obligatory pension system and pension 
provision (including minimum pension) as well as the pension calculations refer to 
2019. It was assumed, that the pension provision is acquired at the moment of 
achieving the minimum retirement age of 60 for women and 65 for men. 
For the measurement of the equality of desert in the pension system the pension 
provision covers both the individual pension and the survivor’s benefit. The reason 
for that is that the derived pension benefits constitute an important source of income, 
especially for older women (OECD 2018, pp. 233-254). 
The results of the calculation show that the median pension provision of male 
beneficiaries born in the years 1974-1981 is about 36 percent points lower than 
the median male actuarial annuity (Table 1). In the case of women the difference 
amounts to less than 4 percentage point, which means that their median pension 
provision only slightly differs from the actuarial one. When comparing the results 
between women and men it has to be stressed that there is an inequality against 
male beneficiaries and the level of this inequality (in percentage points) seems to 
be quite stable across all cohorts. 
Table 1. The indicator of pension equivalence 𝑬𝒆𝒑 𝒕  and the corrected indicator 
of pension equivalence 𝑺𝑬𝒆𝒑 𝒕  for beneficiaries born in the years 1974-1981 
Cohort 
born in 
the year t 
The indicator  
of pension 
equivalence 
𝐸 𝑡  (in pp) 
The difference 










𝑆𝐸 𝑡  (in pp) 






gender 𝑅𝑆𝐸  𝑡  
(in pp) male female male female
1974 –36,31 –3,58 –32,73 –37,34 –8,23 –29,11
1975 –35,98 0,00 –35,98 –36,68 –4,48 –32,20
1976 –36,29 –0,70 –35,59 –38,14 –6,10 –32,04
1977 –35,00 –0,32 –34,69 –35,81 –7,34 –28,47
1978 –35,70 –2,19 –33,51 –36,75 –7,40 –29,35
1979 –35,90 –2,29 –33,61 –36,86 –9,31 –27,54
1980 –35,49 –2,69 –32,80 –37,58 –8,84 –28,75
1981 –35,97 –1,43 –34,54 –36,64 –8,92 –27,72
Total –35,59 –3,83 –31,77 –37,62 –10,93 –26,69
Source: results of author’s own calculations based on the microsimulation model. 
If we assume that all periods of care for children and dependents (i.e. periods of 
maternity, parental, paternity and child care leave or long-term care) are evaluated 
for the pension provision as if  paid work was performed during the care and there 
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is no limitation for long-term care in treating those periods as contributory ones 
in the pension system4 the results show only a little difference for men. Their 
corrected indicator of pension equivalence increases by about 1-2 percentage 
points depending on the cohort. It is because care is mostly delivered by women. 
In their case the higher evaluation of care periods for pension provision causes 
their pension capital to increase by about 4-7 percent. Consequently, the median 
female ‘care corrected’ pension provision is lower than their actuarial annuity by 
about 11 percentage points. 
As a result the indicator of equality of desert in the obligatory pension system 
amounts to 29 percentage points and according to the partial indicators is negative 
(Fig. 2). It means that the inequality of desert is the male case and their median pension 
provision differs from the actuarial annuity much more than the female one. 
Fig. 3. The indicator of equality of desert (in pp) in the Polish pension system 
according to gender for the beneficiaries born in the years 1964-1981 
Source: results of author’s own calculations based on the microsimulation model. 
5. Conclusions
It has been stressed that what has been measured is the level of inequality of desert 
in the pension system between women and men only. It means that the main focus 
is on is the difference between sexes and not the absolute level of various indicators. 
Secondly, the purpose of the paper was to operationalize and estimate the equality of 
desert and not to ask why some pension regulations were introduced. 
The pension reform of 1999 was aimed at strengthening the link between 
individual contributions and pension provisions and following the justice 
understood as an equality of desert. To achieve this goal the defined contribution 
pension formula has been introduced. In this paper the desert was defined as both 
4 If the contributions for long-term care were paid in the Polish obligatory pension system, 
they are limited up to the period required for acquiring the minimum pension (20 insurance 
period for women and 25 for men). 
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financial and non-financial input into the pension system, which differs from the 
previous research. Furthermore, the pension provision from the obligatory pension 
system was simulated on the basis of real biographical data and not given 
biography scenarios.  
The results of this research show that there is a large inequality of desert in the 
obligatory pension system in Poland. It seems to contradict the leading principle 
of individual equivalence.5 This inequality is especially to men’s disadvantage. 
The reasons for this situation can be a field of further research. One of the 
explanations could be the establishment of a minimum pension from which 
women benefit more often than men.  Furthermore, the interest rate taken for the 
calculation plays a role, too.6 Lower interest rate (for a given cohort and 
mandatory retirement age) increases lump sum contribution needed for a given 
level of pension provision and consequently lead to lower annuities. As a result, 
if the lower interest rate was taken for the calculations, inequality drops down or 
even reverses. On the other hand, the spotlight  in this research is on the difference 
in equality between women and men. The assumed interest rate is the same for 
both sexes, so it should be less important for the results. Another issue is that uni-
sex tables lead to higher life expectancy for men and lower for women than in the 
case of single-sex tables. However, this factor does not seem to be crucial (Malec 
2017) especially, because uni-sex tables were consistently applied both in the 
calculations of pension provision and annuities. 
It has to be stressed, that higher evaluation of non-paid care input into the pension 
system causes reduction of the inequality by about 5 percent points. Therefore a 
question arises about the possible recommendation of this approach for policy 
making sake. However, these recommendations should follow the decision 
concerning the desired direction of achieving equality of desert (if we assume it 
as a goal at all): should it be achieved by reduction of non-paid work rewarded in 
the pension system or its evaluation for the pension purposes (which will lead to 
higher inequality indicators among women) or should we broaden the non-
financial input into the pension system by rewarding activities which are much 
more typical for men than for women (which will lead to lower inequality among 
men)? This normative question, however, goes far beyond the scope of this paper. 
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